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Abstract
We reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the monetary policy instrument in a dy-
namic general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous growth in which a fraction of productive
government spending is nanced by means of issuing currency. We evaluate the performance
of four monetary instruments: monetary aggregate targeting, nominal interest rate targeting,
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1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that the central bank operating procedures could a¤ect the uctuations
of macroeconomic variables. Monetary authorities may control directly one instrument out of
several possible choices. For example, they can target the money supply (or monetary aggregate),
the nominal interest rate, the ination rate or the real interest rate, while the others adjust
endogenously. As the targeting of one of the instruments could lead to a superior performance
than the targeting of the others, monetary authorities should decide which instrument to choose.
In this paper we want to reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the monetary policy
instrument in a general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous growth where the productive
government spending is partially nanced by means of currency printing. We evaluate the
performance of four monetary instruments from the point of view of both uctuations of endogenous
variables and welfare.
As it was already pointed out by Poole (1970) in an IS-LM framework, the problem of nding
the optimal policy instrument is irrelevant when we are dealing with a non-stochastic economy.
The question becomes however relevant under uncertainty. Poole evaluated the performance of two
procedures, the monetary aggregate targeting and the nominal interest rate targeting, by looking
at output and price uctuations. He found that when the origin of disturbances comes mainly
from money demand shocks to target the nominal interest rate is the best policy in terms of
output stabilization, whereas to target the rate of monetary growth is the most stabilizing policy
when the origin of disturbances comes mainly from real shocks. Concerning price uctuations, he
recommends nominal interest rate targeting as a more price stabilizing policy.
After Pooles contribution the question of the choice between monetary aggregate targeting
or nominal interest rate targeting when the economy is subject to technology, scal and/or
monetary shocks has been analyzed by several authors through more sophisticated frameworks.
For example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) consider a cash-in-advance model with portfolio rigidity
in the householdscash-saving choice, and nd that interest rate targeting is the instrument that
outperforms monetary aggregate targeting in terms of welfare even if the former delivers more
volatile output. Collard, Dellas and Ertz (1998) evaluate those two targeting procedures in a growth
model with labor augmenting technological progress. They conclude that nominal interest rate
targeting results in higher welfare and lower volatility of both output and ination rate regardless
of the origin of the shocks generating the disturbances. Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) study the
e¤ect of the choice between monetary aggregate and nominal interest rate targeting on the level
of the risk premium in a cash-in-advance economy without capital where labor contracts induce
rigidities. They nd that, under nominal interest rate targeting, the average level of the real interest
rate is higher and prices are less volatile. Nevertheless, they conclude that it is not clear which
policy performs better in terms of welfare. Collard and Dellas (2005) analyze a related question
in a model with capital, staggered prices, and money in the utility function. They nd that the
targeting procedure that performs better in terms of welfare di¤ers from the one that minimizes
the output uctuations. The relative risk aversion parameter plays a crucial role in their analysis
since, when the relative risk aversion is higher than unity, nominal interest rate performs better for
scal shocks, whereas monetary aggregate targeting leads to higher welfare under liquidity shocks.
Considering a wider choice of monetary policy targets, Collard and Dellas (2006) examine
the performance of the money growth rate targeting, nominal interest rate targeting, and ination
targeting in a model with physical capital with adjustment and transaction costs for money demand.
Independently of many key features of their model (risk aversion, size of markup, level of capital
adjustment costs) perfect ination targeting delivers the highest welfare. However, they conclude
that the welfare under perfect ination stability is not signicantly di¤erent from the one achieved
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under the other targeting procedures they analyze. With respect to the comparison between
monetary aggregate and interest rate targeting, their results imply that nominal interest rate
targeting delivers higher welfare, at least in a more realistic model with investment. It is also
the case that the instrument that leads to higher welfare does not necessarily provide the best
stabilization of output. Bhattacharya and Singh (2008) in an overlapping generation model nd
that when the shocks are real, welfare is higher under monetary aggregate targeting and, when the
shocks are nominal and not large, ination rate targeting leads to higher welfare. Some papers also
study the performance of the nominal income targeting. Canzoneri and Dellas (1998), for example,
conclude that nominal income targeting is an intermediate case between monetary aggregate and
nominal interest rate targeting since it acts like monetary aggregate targeting for productivity
shocks and like nominal interest rate targeting for liquidity shocks. Finally, Kim and Henderson
(2005) nd that the nominal income growth targeting leads to higher welfare than the ination
targeting.
As we have seen, the specic features of the previous models lead to di¤erent conclusions about
the welfare achieved under alternative targeting procedures. We want to contribute to the debate
by introducing a new link between the monetary and the real side of the economy and by analyzing
the performance of the model under an instrument not considered in the previous literature, namely,
the real interest rate targeting. On the one hand, monetary policy will have a direct real e¤ect since
we assume that productive government spending could be nanced through seigniorage. On the
other hand, by allowing the central bank to target the real interest rate, the monetary authority
dissolves the uncertainty about what borrowers have to pay in real terms. Note that a central bank
with an ination rate objective that controls the nominal interest rate has in fact an implicit real
interest rate target.
In this paper we deal with an endogenous growth model in which three kinds of shocks usually
taken into account in the literature are present: productivity (or technology), scal (or government
spending) and liquidity (or money demand) shocks. We consider a production function with
productive government spending. Barro (1990) assumes in his model that the government spending
is entirely nanced by means of a at rate income tax. Blackburn and Hung (1996) assume instead
that the government nances its spending through seigniorage, that is, by printing money. We will
assume that the government obtains revenues from taxes, from issuing debt, and from seigniorage. If
the revenues from income taxes were disregarded, the model would display unrealistic values for the
money growth rate and the nominal interest rates. Therefore, we combine both scal and monetary
nancing as in Palivos and Yip (1995). The nancing of the government spending by seigniorage
allows our model to create a new link between the monetary and the real side of the economy since
the inationary revenues obtained by the government are transformed into productive spending.
Under this specication, technology and scal shocks enter directly into the production function.
Finally, money demand shocks are introduced in the form of a modied cash-in-advance constraint
in the spirit of Woodford (1991).1
Let us mention that many countries subject to large tax evasion have used seigniorage to obtain
easy inationary revenues (see Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 and 1995). Moreover, Fishlow
and Friedman (1994) document empirically for the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile that the
governments of these countries during the period 1950-1990 have relied heavily on inationary
nancing in order to get the revenue that their ine¢ cient tax systems were unable to generate.
These authors argue that the ination associated with money creation results in less reported
income by taxpayers and, hence, to less regular scal revenues collected by the tax authority. This
is due to the so called Tanzi-Olivera e¤ect, according to which both the delay in tax auditing and
1Our model coincides with the one of Palivos and Yip (1995) only in the form of the government spending nancing.
They do not consider productive government spending, nor work with a modied cash-in-advance constraint.
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the lack of indexation of tax penalties reduces the real nes to be paid by the taxpayers who are
caught evading by the tax enforcement agency. Therefore, ination provides additional incentives
to tax evading activities. Note that the same amount of seigniorage revenue can be obtained by
selecting one of the monetary policy instruments and letting the money supply to accommodate
the demand for liquidity by the private sector. However, the stabilizing implications of di¤erent
instruments could be quite di¤erent in a stochastic economy exposed to shocks. According to
this view of monetary policy, we consider an economy where the public spending to GDP ratio is
exogenously given and we let the regular scal revenue, and thus either the tax rate or the amount
of public debt outstanding, to be endogenously determined in equilibrium as a function of the
selected level of one of the monetary policy instruments.
We evaluate the inuence of all three aforementioned shocks on the growth rate of the economy,
ination rate, consumption and welfare under four scenarios: when the monetary authority follows
monetary aggregate targeting, nominal interest rate targeting, ination rate targeting or real
interest rate targeting. The new connection that we introduce between the monetary and the
real side of the economy may alter the proportion of government spending that is nanced through
regular scal revenues or through seigniorage. As a reaction to a real shock, money demand has
to adjust keeping the modied cash-in-advanced binding. This adjustment does not have to be
the same under di¤erent targeting procedures as it may induce variations in taxes, public debt,
disposable income, capital and consumption, which then imply di¤erences in the volatilities of the
other variables and in welfare.
Concerning the volatilities of the endogenous variables, we nd that under real shocks the
growth rate of output and consumption exhibit the smallest uctuation under the ination rate
targeting, but the di¤erences with the nominal interest rate targeting and the monetary aggregate
targeting are negligible. The ination rate and the growth rates of output and consumption all
exhibit the highest variability for the real interest rate targeting. The real interest rate targeting
implies a high stability in capital accumulation and the e¤ect of real shocks on output is thus
channeled towards consumption. High volatility of consumption in turn a¤ects the uctuations of
output and prices. Under the money demand shocks these variables are the least volatile under the
nominal interest rate targeting and the most volatile under monetary aggregate targeting. When
the growth rate of nominal balances is xed, the adjustment of the real money to shocks can only
happen via prices and, thus, the variability in the ination rate is the highest, which a¤ects in turn
the uctuations of the other real variables.
Our welfare analysis implies that when the economy is subject to technology or government
spending shocks and the relative risk aversion is higher than unity, the real interest rate targeting
is the procedure that delivers the highest welfare, followed by the nominal interest rate targeting,
monetary aggregate targeting, and ination rate targeting. Ination rate targeting performs the
best when the relative risk aversion is low. Under money demand shocks the monetary aggregate
targeting delivers the highest welfare, followed by the real interest rate targeting, nominal interest
rate targeting, and ination rate targeting. We nd that a high volatility of the endogenous variables
is not necessarily welfare reducing as we have to look at the frequency of the volatility, that is, we
have to distinguish between short-term and long-term uctuations. In fact, if the individualsrisk
aversion is high, the ination rate targeting, which leads to the least volatile economy in the short
run, is not the best instrument in terms of welfare since the real interest rate targeting delivers a
consumption path that is closer to its deterministic path and, thus, the latter procedure performs
better in terms of welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. We
describe the solution technique and calibrate the model in section 3. The evaluation and comparison
of all targeting procedures concerning impulse-responses, uctuations, and welfare is presented in
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section 4. Section 5 provides some nal remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Let us consider an economy populated by innitely lived identical households. The preferences of
a representative household at time t are given by the following utility function dened over the
random stream of consumption fcjg1j=t :
Et
24 1X
j=t
j t
 
c1 j   1
1  
!35 ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor,  > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (or the index of relative risk aversion). At the beginning of the economy a monetary
policy is set. The sequence of events within each period is the following:
1) Individuals enter a given period t with a certain amount of monetary balances Mt; nominal
bonds Bt; and real assets zt.
2) Individuals learn the state of the economy. The state of the economy is characterized by a vector
of technology, money demand, and public spending to GDP ratio shocks, (At; st; Gt): We assume
that all these three shocks are mutually independent.
3) Individuals supply inelastically a unit of labor and production takes place.
4) Individuals receive their real income in the form of a wage wt and a return to asset holdings at
the rate qt.
5) Income is taxed by the government at the rate  t.
6) The goods market opens and individuals purchase consumption using their money balances and
a fraction of their after-tax income.
7) The monetary holdings of agents are augmented by a lump sum transfer Xt from the government.
The amount Xt is endogenously determined in the system according to the assumed operation of
the monetary policy.
8) The nancial market opens and agents choose their nominal money holdingsMt+1 and their assets
holdings zt+1 for period t+1: They also purchase (or issue) one-period nominally denominated pure
discount bonds paying Bt+1 units of money at period t+1 while they cost
Bt+1
1 + it+1
units of money
at period t: The variable it+1 is the nominal interest rate between period t and t+ 1:
The budget constraint for period t is thus the following:
ct + zt+1 +
Mt+1
pt
+
Bt+1
(1 + it+1) pt
 (1   t) [wt + qtzt] + zt + Mt
pt
+
Bt
pt
+
Xt
pt
: (2)
In strict cash-in-advance models with uncertainty and a single consumption good, consumers must
purchase such a good by using only currency, and the income earned in the current period cannot
be converted into money until the next nancial exchange. However, following Woodford (1991),
we will assume here that a fraction of the t period after-tax income can be used for current period
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purchases. Moreover, like in Canzoneri and Dellas (1998), we allow this fraction to uctuate
randomly. Therefore, the cash-in-advance constraint becomes
ct  Mt
pt
+ st(1   t) [wt + qtzt] ; (3)
where st is the money demand shock. Money demand shocks are assumed to be lognormally
distributed and to follow an autoregressive process,
ln st+1 = (1  s)ln s+ s ln st + "s;t+1; (4)
where s 2 (0; 1) ; ln s is the unconditional expected value of the logarithm of the money
demand shock, and the stochastic process f"s;tg is identically and independently distributed with
"s;t  N(0; 2s): The shock st can be viewed as a measure of the e¢ ciency of the payment system.
Depending on both the after-tax income (1    t) [wt + qtzt] and the realization of the shock st in
the current period, agents know how severe their cash-in-advance constraint is. If we set st = 0 for
all t; we would obtain the cash-in-advance constraint usually found in standard monetary models.
In this case, only the currency held at the end of the previous nancial exchange could be used to
purchase goods. A more general cash-in-advance constraint (3) allows a fraction st of the after-tax
income in period t to be spent immediately. Clearly, a high value of st means that less income has to
be converted into a non-interest bearing asset (money) in order to get a given level of consumption.
Thus a higher value of st corresponds to a more e¢ cient payment system and is obviously associated
with a higher velocity of money.
A representative household chooses the stochastic vector sequence fct;Mt+1; Bt+1; zt+1g1t=1 in
order to maximize the expected discounted sum of instantaneous utilities (1) subject to the budget
constraint (2) and the cash-in-advance constraint (3).
2.2 Firms
In this economy there are identical rms, and each of them produces the single good of this economy
according to the technology represented by the gross production function
yt = Atk

t ( gt)
1  ; (5)
where yt is the output per worker, At is a random variable that represents the technology shock,
kt is the stock of capital per worker, gt is the government spending per worker,  2 (0; 1) is the
elasticity of output with respect to capital and  2 (0; 1] is the fraction of government spending
that is productive.2 Our formulation follows thus that of Barro (1990), according to which the ow
of government spending raises factor productivity. The rate of depreciation of private capital is :
Technology shocks are also assumed to be lognormally distributed and to follow an autoregressive
process,
lnAt+1 = (1  A)lnA+ A lnAt + "A;t+1; (6)
where A 2 (0; 1), lnA is the unconditional expected value of the logarithm of the technology shock,
and the stochastic process f"A;tg is identically and independently distributed with "A;t  N(0; 2A):
We normalize the number of rms so that there is a rm per consumer. Firms do not pay any fee
for the use of public services associated with the ow of government spending. Consumers lend
both capital and labor to the rms. Both the rental price of capital qt and the real wage wt are set
2We assume that the unproductive government spending does not enter into the representative consumerutility
as, for example, in Mankiw (1987).
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competitively so that rms end up getting zero prots in equilibrium. Therefore, the competitive
wage and interest rate are equal to the marginal productivities of labor and capital, respectively,
wt = (1  )Atkt ( gt)1  ; (7)
qt = Atk
 1
t ( gt)
1    : (8)
2.3 Government
The government of this economy takes the public spending to GDP ratio as given and controls the
values of the monetary policy parameters. We will consider that the government spends a fraction
Gt of GDP in each period,
gt
yt
= Gt: (9)
This fraction is stochastic and we assume it to be lognormally distributed and to follow an
autoregressive process,
lnGt+1 = (1  G)lnG+ G lnGt + "G;t+1; (10)
where G 2 (0; 1), lnG is the unconditional expected value of the logarithm of the government
spending to GDP ratio, and the stochastic process f"G;tg is identically and independently
distributed with "G;t  N(0; 2G):
Concerning how the monetary policy is conducted, government has at its disposal four monetary
instruments: it can regulate the monetary aggregate, the nominal interest rate, the ination rate,
or the real interest rate. When one of the variables is targeted, the others adjust endogenously.
We assume that government expenditures are nanced by a at-rate income tax, by printing
money (seigniorage), and by borrowing, so that the government budget constraint is
gt =  t (yt   kt) + Xt
pt
+t (11)
where  t is the tax rate on net income, Xt is the nominal amount of money injected into the economy
in period t; and t is the real net amount borrowed from consumers by selling them bonds. In
order to nance the ow of its productive spending, the government borrows the amount gt per
worker at the beginning of period t. Immediately after production has taken place, the government
pays some of its spending by taxing income. After consumption has taken place, money and bonds
are issued to nance the rest of the government spending and to repay the debt rolled over from
the previous period.
We will consider two scenarios: (a) the present value of real debt is constant over time
Bt+1
(1 + it+1) pt
=
Bt
pt
for all t; (12)
which implies that the government never incurs a real decit, i.e., t = 0 for all t; and the tax rate
endogenously adjusts in every period so as to full the government budget constraint (11), and (b)
the tax rate is set constant over time,  t =  for all t; and the present value of debt varies so as to
full the government budget constraint.
2.4 Equilibrium
All markets in this economy must clear in equilibrium. Asset market clears when
kt = zt: (13)
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From the rm prots maximization (7) and (8) we get that the net income can be replaced in
equilibrium by the net production,
wt + qtkt = Atk

t ( gt)
1    kt: (14)
Taking into account (14) we can write the market clearing conditions for goods, money and bonds
as follows:
Atk

t ( gt)
1  = ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + gt; (15)
Mt+1 = Mt +Xt = t+1Mt; (16)
Bt+1
(1 + it+1) pt
=
Bt
pt
+t; (17)
where t+1 is the gross rate of growth of the money supply.
Let t and t be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint
(2) and the cash-in-advance constraint (3), respectively. The solution of the problem faced by a
consumer is characterized by the following derivatives of the corresponding Lagrangian with respect
to consumption, money, government bonds and capital, respectively,
c t = t + t; (18)
t
pt
= Et

t+1 + t+1
pt+1

; (19)
t
pt
=  (1 + it+1)Et

t+1
pt+1

; (20)
t = Et
 
t+1
(
1 + (1   t+1)
"
At+1

 gt+1
kt+1
1 
  
#)!
+
Et
 
t+1st+1(1   t+1)
"
At+1

 gt+1
kt+1
1 
  
#!
: (21)
Moreover, the following transversality conditions must hold:
lim
j!1
Et
 
t+jt+jkt+j+1

= 0
and
lim
j!1
Et

t+jt+j
Bt+j+1
pt+j

= 0:
The Lagrange multipliers t and t associated with the budget constraint and cash-in-advance
constraints can be interpreted as the marginal utility of wealth and the marginal utility of real
balances, respectively. The rst order condition on consumption (18) tells us that the existence of
binding liquidity constraint drives a wedge between the marginal utility of wealth and the marginal
utility of consumption, since wealth cannot be used instantaneously to buy consumption goods.
The left hand side of the rst order condition on nominal balances (19) can be interpreted as the
loss of utility due to the acquisition of an extra unit of money. At the margin this amount must be
equal to the value of the liquidity services provided by such a unit of money plus the discounted
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expected utility increase due to capital gains resulting from price level changes. Conditions (20) and
(21) combine the costs and expected gains of investing one marginal unit of wealth into government
bonds and capital, respectively.
The real interest rate rt+1 can be obtained from the real present value of an indexed bond that
can be bought at period t and that pays one sure unit of real wealth at the end of period t+ 1;
1
1 + rt+1
= Et

t+1
t

: (22)
Combing equations (19) and (22) we can get the relationship between the real interest rate, the
nominal interest rate, and the ination rate,
1 + rt+1 = (1 + it+1)
Et

t+1
pt+1
pt

Et (t+1)
: (23)
Denition: Given the set of initial conditions z1; M1; B1, an equilibrium is a vector of stochastic
processes
ct; zt+1; wt; qt; kt; Mt+1; Bt+1; t+1; it+1; rt+1; pt; gt;  t; At; st; Gt
	1
t=1
such that
(a) the representative household maximizes the discounted expected utility (1) subject to the budget
constraint (2) and the cash-in-advance constraint (3) with the money demand shocks governed by
(4);
(b) rms maximize prots and thus satisfy (7) and (8) with the technology shocks governed by (6);
(c) the government budget constraint (11) holds and government spending satises (9) and (10);
(d) the market clearing conditions for goods, assets, money and bonds, (15), (13), (16) and (17),
hold in every period;
(e.1) if the government does never incur a real decit, then t = 0 for t = 0; 1; :::; or
(e.2) if the government sets a constant tax rate, then  t =  for t = 0; 1; :::; where  is exogenously
given;
(f.1) if the government pegs the rate of monetary growth, then t+1 =  for t = 0; 1; :::; where  is
exogenously given, or
(f.2) if the government pegs the nominal interest rate, then it+1 = i for t = 0; 1; :::; where i is
exogenously given, or
(f.3) if the government pegs the ination rate, then pt+1pt = f for t = 0; 1; :::; where f is exogenously
given, or
(f.4) if the government pegs the nominal interest rate, then rt+1 = r for t = 0; 1; :::; where r is
exogenously given.
3 Solution Method and Calibration of the Model
3.1 Transformation of the Model
In order to analyze the equilibrium of the economy we have to solve simultaneously the equilibrium
equations we have stated above. Since we are dealing with an endogenous growth model, many
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variables are non-stationary. Therefore, we will work instead with variables expressed in ratios. We
dene c^t as the consumption to current period capital ratio and t+1 as the gross rate of growth of
capital per worker,
c^t =
ct
kt
and t+1 =
kt+1
kt
: (24)
We redene accordingly the other variables as
y^t =
yt
kt
; g^t =
gt
kt
; m^t =
Mt
pt kt
; b^t =
Bt
pt kt
; ft+1 =
pt+1
pt
; ^t = tk

t ; and ^t = tk

t ; (25)
where y^t; g^t; m^t; b^t; ft+1; ^t and ^t are the output to capital ratio, government spending to capital
ratio, real balances to capital ratio, real bonds to capital ratio, ination rate, stationary marginal
utility of wealth, and stationary marginal utility of real balances, respectively. The equilibrium
conditions written in terms of the transformed variables can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 Solution Method
Since the previous model does not admit a closed form solution we apply the solution technique
described in detail in Uhlig (1999), which is based on the log-linearization around the steady state
of the equations characterizing the equilibrium given in the Appendix.
3.3 Parameter values
We assign to the parameters of the model the values that match the quarterly US data for the
period 1979:1-1997:2. However, we should point out that our objective is to perform a numerical
analysis aimed at illustrating the behavior of the model and to be able to obtain helpful insights
about the performance of the di¤erent monetary policy targetings.
We use variables with a bar to denote the non-stochastic steady state values of the corresponding
transformed variables. The stationary value of the per worker gross growth rate is set to
 = 1:00375 as found in the data. The discount factor is set to  = 0:99: We will use relative
risk aversion values  ranging from 0:5 to 4 but the baseline case will correspond to  = 1:3 The
value we choose for the baseline growth rate of money supply is  = 1:015; which coincides with
the empirical growth rate of M1. The nominal interest rate that corresponds to this growth rate
of money supply is i = 0:025 and the real interest rate is r = 0:014. The share of capital in the
production function is set equal to  = 0:36: We set the value of the depreciation rate  = 0:0085
in order to match the empirical averages of the ratios of consumption to output and investment
to output (see Table 1). When the present value of debt is constant and the tax rate  t adjusts
endogenously, seigniorage represents 1.3% of government spending, and the average level of the
income tax rate is  = 0:2235: If the present value of debt is variable, the average debt to GDP
ratio is 42%; seigniorage also amounts to the 1.3% of government spending on average, and the
level of the income tax rate is  = 0:2281: To calibrate the stochastic process for technology shocks,
we calculate the Solow residuals using an analogous procedure to that described in Cooley (1997).
The average level lnA of the log of the technology parameter is endogenous, and we set A = 0:99;
and A = 0:009:4 Similarly we nd that lnG =  1:609 the correlation coe¢ cient is G = 0:99;
3Lucas (2003) argues that the values of the relative risk aversion are below 2.5 and this leads many authors to use
a value close to unity.
4Notice that in our calibration a variation in  does not change the growth rate of the economy but it a¤ects
the average level of the technology. In order to keep a given growth rate when the consumers are more patient as 
increases, the value of the technology parameter lnA must increase:
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and the standard error of the shocks is G = 0:011: The parameter values for the e¢ ciency of the
payment system are determined in a similar way. We use data of consumption as a fraction of
GDP and money velocity in order to generate series for st using the cash-in-advance constraint.
We set ln s =  0:4155, s = 0:95 and s = 0:007. Finally, according with Pérez Sánchez (2004),
the fraction of government spending that is productive is set to  = 0:8:5
(Insert Table 1)
4 E¤ects of the Four Targeting Procedures on the Stochastic
Equilibrium
4.1 Impulse-Responses
To see the e¤ects of random shocks we will consider a reaction of the economy to each shock
separately. Moreover, we consider the two aforementioned alternative scal policy scenarios: (a)
the tax rate  t adjusts endogenously and the present value of outstanding debt is kept constant,
and (b) the tax rate  t is kept constant and the government incurs endogenous scal decits. We
will assume that the economy is in the non-stochastic steady state at time t = 0: At time t = 1
the perturbation "A;t ("s;t or "G;t) is selected in such a way that the technology shock (the money
demand shock or the government spending shock) experiences a 1% deviation from its steady state.
These perturbations become "A;t = 0 ("s;t = 0 or "G;t = 0) for all t > 1: We will compare the
reaction of the economy under four di¤erent targeting procedures, monetary aggregate targeting
(M-targeting), nominal interest rate targeting (i-targeting), ination rate targeting (f-targeting)
and real interest rate targeting (r-targeting). For the M-targeting the monetary policy consists of
pegging a constant monetary growth rate, t+1 =  for all t; for the i-targeting it+1 = i for all t,
for the f-targeting ft+1 = f for all t, and for the r-targeting rt+1 = r for all t:
In Figures 1, 2 and 3 we show the impulse-responses to a technology, money demand and
government spending shock, respectively under the two scal policy scenarios mentioned above.
We see that the impulse-responses are qualitatively very similar under the two assumptions
concerning scal policy. When the tax rate adjusts endogenously, the distortion in the capital
versus consumption decision is stochastic (see the consumersbudget constraint (2)). However, the
variation of this distortion on the capital accumulation process is small relative to the standard
crowding out e¤ect governing the transfer of resources from the private to the public sector under
a constant tax rate. All results correspond to the logarithmic utility ( = 1) and the baseline level
of seigniorage, that is, when 1.3% of government spending is nanced by issuing money.
Even if we next discuss the e¤ects of each shock separately, the general picture that emerges
can be summarized as follows. M-targeting, i-targeting and f-targeting exhibit almost identical
impulse-responses to the three types of shocks. However, under r-targeting, impulse-responses are
di¤erent when either technology or government shocks are present. In this case, as the real return
from capital is kept constant, those shocks increase output and are translated mainly into more
consumption. However, since monetary shocks have little real e¤ects, r-targeting displays impulse-
responses similar to those of the other targeting procedures when the economy is hit by those
monetary shocks.
5The model is calibrated in a way that the stationary non-stochastic growth rate is kept constant. For example, a
change in the value of the relative risk aversion would imply a change in the growth rate if the technology parameter
At were not adjusted. Similarly, assigning a di¤erent value for the fraction  of productive government spending
implies changes in the average level of technology and does not a¤ect the relative performance of the economy under
di¤erent targeting procedures.
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4.1.1 E¤ect of Technology Shocks
A positive transitory technology shock increases output directly. This results in a higher return on
capital and higher disposable income. Thus, both consumption purchases and capital accumulation
increase and the fraction of disposable income available for current purchases increases too (see
equations (3) and (14)). In our simulations the reaction of the economy is very similar under the
M-targeting, i-targeting and f-targeting. The demand for real balances adjusts so that the cash-
in-advance constraint is binding.6 In this particular case, at the moment of a shock, real balances
decrease, which implies that future real balances will be relatively higher, and thus the growth
rate of real balances experiences an increase. The adjustment process depends on the particular
targeting procedure under consideration. For M-targeting, higher growth rate of real balances is
achieved by adjusting prices so that the ination rate must decrease. For the i-targeting, ination
must decrease because the real interest rate is higher and the nominal interest rate is xed. There
is also an adjustment that comes via nominal balances as the growth rate of the money supply
increases slightly in the short run. For the f-targeting all the adjustment goes via nominal balances
and, hence, the growth rate of nominal balances must increase.
Impulse responses are a little bit di¤erent under the r-targeting. The fact that the real
interest rate is xed prevents capital accumulation from exhibiting a signicant reaction to a
shock. The positive e¤ect of the shock on the disposable income is absorbed mainly by an increase
in consumption. This implies that real balances increase, which means in turn that future real
balances will be relatively lower and, thus, the short-run growth rate of real balances will decrease.
This behavior is obtained on the one hand by a decrease in the growth rate of nominal balances
and on the other hand by a decrease in the ination rate. Impulse-responses of several variables to
technology shocks for the baseline parameters are plotted in Figure 1.7
(Insert Figure 1)
4.1.2 E¤ect of Money Demand Shocks
A positive transitory money demand shock relaxes the liquidity constraint and, therefore, the value
of money will be lower. Under the M-targeting the growth rate of the money supply cannot vary
and a decrease in seigniorage (caused by a decrease in real balances) must be compensated by an
increase in the revenues raised by the scal policy. The induced decrease in the return to capital
triggers an increase in consumption. To accomplish a reduction in the real monetary balances, the
current price must increase. However, as the future price will be lower than the current one, the
ination rate decreases in the short run. Notice that the e¤ect of a 1% deviation of the e¢ ciency
of the payment system from its steady state value causes only a 0.0036% deviation of the growth
rate of capital from its steady state value. In contrast, a 1% deviation of the technology shock from
its steady state value triggers a deviation of the growth rate of capital of 0.07%, which is roughly
20 times higher. This means that the e¤ect of money demand shocks on real variables is almost
6We choose to use the timing of events due to Svensson (1985) because it simplies the equilibrium equations.
Due to this timing of events in our model, the cash-in-advance constraint (3) could become non-binding for some
realizations of the shocks. Several studies that take into account analogous timing conclude that the cash-in-advance
constraint is binding for almost all shock realizations, see for example Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lucas (1991) or
Hromcová (2007). However, we check in our simulations that the marginal utility of real balances (the Lagrange
multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint) is always positive and we can thus write the cash-in-advance constraint
with equality.
7To keep the real interest rate xed, ination and nominal interest rates must react in the same direction. The
magnitude of the response of the nominal interest rate is huge compared to the other variables. It experiences a
decrease of 200% and, therefore, it is not included in Figure 1.
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negligible. As far as the reaction of the ination rate is concerned, the e¤ect of a money demand
shock is double than the one of a technology shock of the same magnitude.
For the i-targeting and f-targeting, the adjustment of real balances is achieved mainly through
as increase in the nominal balances, which makes the ination rate stable in both cases. An increase
in seigniorage results in a reduction of the tax rate, an increase in the disposable income, and an
increase in the growth rate of capital. The small reduction of consumption comes together with
this increase in the growth rate of capital. Notice however, that the deviation of the growth rate
of capital is about 10 times lower than in the case of the M-targeting. Under the r-targeting the
adjustment of real balances takes place via nominal balances and prices. The reaction of the growth
rate of capital is constrained by the xed real interest rate as any increase in the growth rate of
nominal balances must be compensated by a decrease in prices. The growth rate of capital slightly
decreases, which implies a slight increase in consumption. As before, the deviation of the growth
rate of capital from its steady state value is negligible. Impulse-responses of several variables to
money demand shocks for the baseline parameters are plotted in Figure 2.
(Insert Figure 2)
4.1.3 E¤ect of Government Spending Shocks
A positive transitory shock in government spending has a similar e¤ect as the one of a technology
shock because it a¤ects directly the output (see equations (5) and (9)). The main di¤erence is that
the revenues from scal policy (either from taxes or debt) must temporarily increase as there is
more government consumption to be paid for. An increase in the scal revenues partially o¤sets the
positive e¤ect of the shock on income. However, disposable income still increases and the e¤ect of
a government spending shock on other variables is qualitatively analogous to the case of a positive
technology shock described above. Impulse-responses of several variables to government spending
shocks for the baseline parameters are plotted in Figure 3.
(Insert Figure 3)
4.2 Comparison of the Four Targeting Procedures
In this section we compare the performance of the four targeting procedures from the point of view
of the volatilities of the relevant endogenous variables and of welfare. We consider again the two
scal scenarios discussed above: one with no real decits and endogenous tax rates and another
with a constant tax rate and endogenous government decits. The results concerning uctuations
and welfare are almost identical in both scal scenarios as the variation in the distortionary e¤ects
of at-rate income taxation is almost negligible relative to the distortion arising under a constant
tax rate.
4.2.1 Fluctuations
The three kinds of shocks introduced in our economy a¤ect the behavior of all variables through
di¤erent channels under the four targeting procedures. We will analyze the induced volatilities on
consumption, on the output growth rate, and on the ination rate. Moreover, we will evaluate
the contribution of all shocks to the total volatility of these variables. Reported volatilities are
calculated as the standard error of the logarithm of the Hodrick-Prescott ltered series. Simulated
series have the length of 80 quarters and we evaluate averages over 1000 shock realizations. We
report the volatilities for four di¤erent values of the relative risk aversion parameter,  = 0:5; 1, 2
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and 4, and for low and high seigniorage,  = 1:015 and 4, respectively.8 We evaluate the following
cases: when the origin of disturbances are all three shocks, only technology shocks, only money
demand shocks, and only government spending shocks, respectively. The results are reported in
Tables 2, 3 and 4.
(Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4)
The volatility of consumption is almost identical for all four procedures when only monetary
shocks a¤ect the economy. It is also practically identical under M-targeting, i-targeting and f-
targeting under technology and government spending shocks. Consumption is considerably more
volatile for the r-targeting for technology and government spending shocks. As we already argued
when analyzing the impulse-reponses, this occurs because the return to capital is stabilized by the
monetary policy and, thus, consumption must absorb the e¤ect of shocks on output.
Output and its growth rate is a¤ected in a very similar way by all analyzed targeting procedures.
The volatility is slightly higher for the real interest rate targeting due to higher variability of
consumption.
To explain the volatility of the ination rate, we have to look at the behavior of real balances.
A variation in consumption is accompanied by an adjustment in the real balances. At the moment
when the consumption takes place, the nominal balances are already chosen (in the nancial
exchange stage of the previous period). Therefore, real balances adjust via changes in prices.
For a given set of parameter values, higher volatility of consumption implies in general a higher
volatility of prices with the obvious exception of the ination rate targeting.
The ordering of targeting procedures according to the volatilities does not vary for di¤erent
risk aversion parameters, neither for di¤erent levels of seigniorage. Moreover, we can see from the
production function (5) and (9) that dytdAt =
1
 and
dyt
dGt
= 1  : As
1
 >
1 
 ; we obtain that the
contribution of technology shocks is more important than the one of government spending shocks.
Finally, the impact of money demand shocks on the overall volatility of all three analyzed variables
is negligible.
4.2.2 Welfare
In order to asses the welfare implications of the di¤erent targeting instruments of monetary policy,
we should evaluate the welfare of the representative agent, which is given by
W = E0
" 1X
t=0
t
 
c1 t   1
1  
!#
: (26)
To this end we calculate the welfare as an empirical mean of 1000 shock realizations of time series
with a horizon of 1500 periods.
We again let the origin of disturbances be all three kinds of shocks, only technology shocks,
only money demand shocks, and only government spending shocks. We choose the ination rate
targeting to be a reference policy. We evaluate welfare di¤erences as a percentage of consumption
8When the average rate of growth of money supply is 1.5%, about 1.5% of the government spending is nanced
by issuing money, i.e., seignorage is low. When the average gross growth rate of money supply is 300%, from 45% up
to 68% of government spending is nanced by seignorage, i.e., seignorage is high. For a given value of ; the higher is
the value of risk aversion ; the higher is the percentage of government spending that must be nanced by seigniorage
in order to obtain the same growth rate.
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which must be added, or subtracted, in order to obtain the same welfare as under the reference
policy. We thus look for the value  that fullls
E0
( 1X
t=0
t
"
(1 + ) c1 t   1
1  
#)
= E0
8><>:
1X
t=0
t
264

cf-targetingt
1    1
1  
375
9>=>;
where
n
cf-targetingt
o1
t=0
is the consumption path obtained under the ination rate targeting.
Targeting procedures are ordered according to the welfare so achieved. Positive numbers for 
mean that, in order to obtain the same welfare level as under the f-targeting, the percentage  of
consumption given in Table 5 must be added to the original consumption in every period. Negative
numbers mean that, if agents reduce that much percentage of their consumption, they would obtain
the same welfare as under the ination rate targeting. Results are reported in Table 5.
(Insert Table 5 )
In order to explain the welfare di¤erences it is important to look at the behavior of consumption
over a long period of time as the frequency of uctuations has crucial implications for welfare. Short-
run volatility of consumption turns out to be not so important for welfare. We plot the evolution of
consumption under the f-targeting and r-targeting when the economy is hit by a random sequence
of technology shocks for di¤erent levels of risk aversion and for the two scal scenarios under
consideration in Figure 4. We can observe that, as the agents become more risk averse, they
want to smooth their lifetime consumption path and the deviations from the non-stochastic trend
decrease. As we have already argued, under the r-targeting technological shocks have a strong
e¤ect on consumption and a much moderate e¤ect on capital accumulation. Therefore, under
this procedure the path of capital is very smooth. The long-run uctuation of capital is inherited
also by the other variables, like consumption, output, and government spending. Thus, all the
other variables uctuate in the short run close to their non-stochastic long-run trend. Under the
f-targeting the real interest rate uctuates and, hence, the path of capital and other variables
exhibits deviations from the non-stochastic trend that are much larger in the long run. Therefore,
very risk averse agents obtain on average higher welfare when their consumption does not deviate
much from its non-stochastic long-run trend. This means that the r-targeting is the procedure that
delivers the highest welfare when risk aversion is high. However, very high deviations from the
long-run trend may result in welfare gains under low risk aversion since now agents care mainly
about their consumption in the short run. Thus, depending on the actual sequence of shocks the r-
targeting may be dominated by other targeting procedures. Averaging over 1000 shock realizations
(which are the same for all parameters presented in Table 5) the i-targeting is ranked as the second
concerning welfare, just after the r-targeting when the risk aversion parameter  is high (see Table
5). However, when  is low, our simulations show that the f-targeting is the procedure that delivers
the highest level of welfare.
(Insert Figure 4)
We can also see in Table 5 that for the logarithmic utility function ( = 1) the di¤erences
between the M-targeting, i-targeting and f-targeting are negligible, as they are up to 0.005% of
the stream of consumption. However, these di¤erences get larger when the value of  is set away
(either above or below) from 1. For instance, for  = 4 they might take values close to 5%.
Under the money demand shocks the M-targeting delivers the highest welfare. Again, the
consumption series are very similar for all targeting procedures and the di¤erences are much smaller
since they amount just up to 0.01% of the stream of consumption.
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Under the government spending shocks the behavior of the welfare is again similar to the case
when only technology shocks occur. For  < 1 the f-targeting leads to the highest welfare, whereas
for  > 1 it is the r-targeting the one that delivers more welfare. For example, the model implies
that for  = 2 and  = 1:015; a switch from the ination rate targeting to the real interest rate
targeting would on average produce a gain equivalent to the 1.5% in the stream of consumption of
agents.
We can summarize the main implication of our previous analysis by saying that under high risk
aversion and real shocks (i.e., either technological or government shocks), to target the real interest
rate is the procedure that yields a higher expected welfare.
5 Final remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the e¤ects of four targeting procedures of monetary policy in an
economy where the government uses money creation to nance productive public spending. We have
studied how the endogenous variables react to unexpected transitory shocks and we have shown the
contribution of the three particular shocks to the uctuations of the growth rate, ination rate, and
consumption. We have compared welfare levels obtained under four particular targeting procedures
and two alternative scal policies (constant real government debt versus constant tax rates). We
should mention that we have considered a new targeting procedure in our analysis, namely, the
real interest targeting, which is in fact used indirectly by some central banks that have an ination
rate objective and control the nominal interest rate simultaneously.
We nd that the behavior of the economy is quite similar under the monetary aggregate
targeting, nominal interest rate targeting, and ination rate targeting. When the real interest
rate is taken as a monetary policy instrument, the larger consumption volatility in the short run
accompanied by a smaller volatility in the long run causes signicant welfare di¤erences with respect
to the other three targeting procedures. Therefore, not only the volatility of consumption but also
its frequency is crucial to grasp the welfare implications of the alternative monetary instruments
under consideration.
Let us nish our paper with a more precise comparison of our results with those obtained in the
related literature. Comparing the two targeting instruments originally considered by Poole (1970),
we nd that the nominal interest rate targeting delivers higher welfare than the monetary aggregate
targeting for technology and government spending shocks, and the monetary aggregate targeting is
welfare improving when only money demand shocks a¤ect the economy. Our results thus coincide
with those of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) and Collard, Dellas and Ertz (1998).9 However, our
results contrast with those obtained by Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) where no procedure clearly
dominated the other in terms of welfare.10 At the value  = 4 for the relative risk aversion parameter
our model predicts that, by using the nominal interest rate targeting, welfare can be improved by
5% with respect to the monetary aggregate targeting. Recall that Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) do
not include a possibility of capital accumulation, while Collard, Dellas and Ertz (1998) do allow for
it. The presence of capital in the model enables the substitution between the capital accumulation
and consumption, which is a new channel for the adjustment to shocks.
Canzoneri and Dellas (2006) nd that the ination targeting leads to the highest welfare, but
the di¤erences from the nominal interest rate and monetary aggregate targeting are not signicant.
Ination targeting in our model also leads to the highest welfare, but only when the relative risk
aversion is low, i.e., when   1: For the relative risk aversion close to unity, switching from the
9Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) do not consider money demand shocks.
10These authors considered a value of the risk aversion parameter between 1 and 4.
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ination rate targeting to the monetary aggregate targeting or to the nominal interest rate targeting
would mean a welfare loss of less than 0.01% of the consumption stream. For  > 1; which is a
parametrization generally accepted in the literature, the xed real interest rate is the targeting
procedure that leads to the highest welfare. Our model predicts that for  = 2 ( = 4) a switch
from the ination targeting towards the real interest rate targeting results in 9% (35%) increase in
the stream of consumption.
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Appendix
Transformed equilibrium equations
Using the variables dened in (24) and (25), equations (15), (5), (3), (11), (16), (18), (19), (21),
(20), (22) and (9) become
c^t + t+1   (1  ) + g^t = y^t; (27)
y^t = At ( g^t)
1  ; (28)
c^t = m^t + st (1   t) (y^t   ) ; (29)
g^t =  t (y^t   ) + (t+1   1)m^t +
ft+1t+1b^t+1
1 + it+1
  b^t; (30)
t+1 =
m^t+1
m^t
t+1ft+1; (31)
c^ t = ^t + ^t; (32)
^t = Et
 
^t+1 + ^t+1
ft+1
 t+1
!
; (33)
^t = Et
n
^t+1
 
t+1 f1 + (1   t+1) [y^t+1   ]g+ ^t+1 t+1st+1 (1   t+1) [y^t+1   ]
o
; (34)
^t
1 + it+1
= Et
 
^t+1
ft+1
 t+1
!
; (35)
^t
1 + rt+1
= Et

^t+1
 
t+1

(36)
and
g^t = (AtGt)
1
  
1 
 ; (37)
Setting the level of the technology lnAt = lnA; the e¢ ciency of the payment system ln st = ln s;
and government spending to GDP ratio lnGt = lnG constant for all periods, we get the equilibrium
equations that characterize the non-stochastic (or deterministic) steady state.
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data model
government spending/output 0.2 0.2
consumption/output 0.65 0.63
investment/output 0.15 0.17
debt held by public/output 0.42 0.42
Table 1: Comparison between the average empirical and calibrated values of some variables.
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Consumption volatility. Case with stochastic tax rate and no scal decit
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f i M r
0.01 0.011 0.012 0.055
f i M r
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.044
i f r M
7e-5 8e-5 4e-4 1e-3
f i M r
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.033
0.5 4
M i f r
0.016 0.018 0.018 0.16
M i f r
0.014 0.015 0.015 0.075
i f M r
4e-5 4e-5 2e-3 2e-3
M i f r
0.008 0.01 0.01 0.13
1 1.015
f i M r
0.026 0.026 0.026 0.047
f i M r
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.040
i f r M
4e-5 4e-5 2e-4 6e-4
f i M r
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.026
1 4
f i M r
0.006 0.007 0.007 0.074
f i M r
0.006 0.007 0.007 0.057
i f r M
2e-5 2e-5 2e-4 1e-3
f i M r
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.047
2 1.015
f i M r
0.033 0.033 0.033 0.043
f M i r
0.029 0.029 0.029 0.037
i f r M
2e-5 3e-5 8e-5 2e-4
f M i r
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.022
2 4
f M i r
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.057
f M i r
0.021 0.021 0.021 0.048
i f r M
1e-5 2e-5 7e-5 6e-4
f i M r
0.009 0.01 0.01 0.029
4 1.015
f M i r
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.040
f M i r
0.031 0.031 0.031 0.035
i f r M
1e-5 2e-5 4e-5 1e-4
f M i r
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.02
4 4
f M i r
0.032 0.033 0.033 0.049
f M i r
0.029 0.029 0.03 0.043
i f r M
1e-5 1e-5 3e-5 3e-4
f M i r
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.023
Consumption volatility. Case with constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f i M r
0.011 0.011 0.012 0.06
f i M r
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.045
i f r M
3e-5 3e-5 2e-5 1e-3
f i M r
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.04
0.5 4
M i f r
0.06 0.07 0.07 0.11
M i f r
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
i f M r
2e-3 2e-3 3e-3 8e-3
M i f r
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.075
1 1.015
f i M r
0.027 0.027 0.027 0.049
f i M r
0.024 0.024 0.024 0.04
i f r M
2e-5 2e-5 1e-4 5e-4
f i M r
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.026
1 4
M i f r
0.008 0.011 0.012 0.07
M i f r
0.007 0.008 0.009 0.056
i f M r
9e-4 9e-4 2e-3 4e-3
M i f r
0.004 0.007 0.008 0.044
2 1.015
f M i r
0.033 0.033 0.033 0.043
f M i r
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.037
f i r M
1e-5 2e-5 5e-5 2e-4
f M i r
0.015 0.016 0.016 0.023
2 4
f i M r
0.018 0.018 0.019 0.057
f M i r
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.048
i f M r
5e-4 6e-4 1e-3 2e-3
f i M r
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.03
4 1.015
f M i r
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.04
f M i r
0.031 0.031 0.032 0.035
i f r M
8e-6 8e-6 3e-5 1e-4
f M i r
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.021
4 4
f M i r
0.031 0.031 0.031 0.049
f M i r
0.028 0.028 0.028 0.043
i f M r
4e-4 4e-4 5e-4 9e-4
f i M r
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.024
Table 2: Consumption volatility for the four targeting procedures;  = relative risk aversion,  = average
growth rate of money supply, (A; s; G) = all three shocks are present, (A) = only technology shocks
are present, (s) = only money demand shocks are present, (G) = only government spending shocks are
present. In the cells we order the targeting procedures according to the calculated volatility. For example
f i M r
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.019
means that the lowest volatility is achieved for the f-targeting, then for the i-
targeting, M-targeting and the highest volatility is observed for the r-targeting. The numbers below state
the standard error of the logarithm of the Hodrick-Prescott ltered series of the consumption for a given
targeting procedure.
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Growth rate volatility. Case with stochastic tax rate and no scal decit
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f i M r
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038
f i M r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
4e-6 4e-6 5e-5 2e-5
f i M r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023
0.5 4
f i M r
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.039
f i M r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f M r
8e-7 7e-7 4e-5 4e-5
f i M r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023
1 1.015
f i M r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f i M r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
2e-6 2e-6 1e-5 3e-5
f i M r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
1 4
f i M r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.039
f i M r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
5e-7 6e-7 6e-6 3e-5
f i M r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023
2 1.015
f M i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f M i r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
2e-6 2e-6 6e-6 2e-5
f M i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
2 4
f M i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f M i r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
4e-7 4e-7 2e-6 2e-5
f i M r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
4 1.015
f M i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f M i r
0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
i f r M
2e-6 2e-6 4e-6 1e-5
f M i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
4 4
f M i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f M i r
0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
i f r M
4e-7 4e-7 1e-6 1e-5
f M i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Growth rate volatility. Case with constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f i M r
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.039
f i M r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
1e-6 1e-6 9e-6 5e-5
f i M r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
0.5 4
f i M r
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.039
M f i r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
1e-6 1e-6 9e-6 7e-5
M f i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023
1 1.015
f i M r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f i M r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
9e-7 9e-7 5e-6 3e-5
f i M r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
1 4
M f i r
0.037 0.038 0.038 0.038
M f i r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
9e-7 9e-7 5e-6 5e-5
M f i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
2 1.015
f M i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f M i r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
7e-7 7e-7 3e-6 2e-5
f M i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
2 4
M f i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
M f i r
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
i f r M
7e-7 7e-7 3e-6 3e-5
M f i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
4 1.015
f M i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
f M i r
0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
i f r M
7e-7 8e-7 3e-6 1e-5
f M i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
4 4
M f i r
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
M f i r
0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
i f r M
7e-7 8e-7 3e-6 2e-5
M f i r
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Table 3: Output growth rate volatility for the four targeting procedures;  = relative risk aversion,  =
average growth rate of money supply, (A; s; G) = all three shocks are present, (A) = only technology
shocks are present, (s) = only money demand shocks are present, (G) = only government spending shocks
are present. In the cells we order the targeting procedures according to the calculated volatility. For example
f M i r
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038
means that the lowest volatility is achieved for the f-targeting, then for the M-
targeting, i-targeting and the highest volatility is observed for the r-targeting. The numbers below state
the standard error of the logarithm of the Hodrick-Prescott ltered series of the growth rate of output for a
given targeting procedure.
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Ination rate volatility. Case with stochastic tax rate and no scal decit
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f M i r
0 0.002 0.004 0.08
f M i r
0 0.001 0.003 0.067
f i r M
0 2e-5 4e-4 0.001
f M i r
0 0.001 0.002 0.04
0.5 4
f i M r
0 0.004 0.015 1.32
f i M r
0 0.003 0.008 0.69
f i M r
0 6e-6 0.007 0.007
f i M r
0 0.002 0.011 0.80
1 1.015
f i M r
0 9e-4 0.002 0.07
f i M r
0 7e-4 8e-4 0.063
f i r M
0 5e-6 4e-4 0.001
f i M r
0 5e-4 8e-4 0.04
1 4
f M i r
0 0.011 0.016 0.72
f M i r
0 0.005 0.013 0.53
f i r M
0 3e-5 0.002 0.007
f M i r
0 0.007 0.009 0.38
2 1.015
f i M r
0 0.001 0.001 0.07
f M i r
0 5e-4 9e-4 0.057
f i r M
0 7e-6 4e-4 0.001
f M i r
0 4e-4 6e-4 0.037
2 4
f i M r
0 0.006 0.009 0.53
f M i r
0 0.003 0.005 0.43
f i r M
0 2e-5 0.001 0.007
f i M r
0 0.003 0.004 0.27
4 1.015
f M i r
0 0.001 0.001 0.06
f M i r
0 3e-4 0.001 0.051
f i r M
0 1e-5 5e-4 0.001
f M i r
0 3e-4 8e-4 0.032
4 4
f M i r
0 0.007 0.009 0.4
f M i r
0 0.002 0.007 0.34
f i r M
0 3e-5 0.001 0.007
f M i r
0 0.002 0.005 0.20
Ination rate volatility. Case with constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f i M r
0 8e-4 0.002 0.12
f i M r
0 7e-4 0.001 0.09
f i r M
0 2e-6 2e-4 0.001
f i M r
0 5e-4 0.002 0.07
0.5 4
f i M r
0 6e-3 0.05 0.71
f i M r
0 5e-3 0.02 0.53
f i M r
0 2e-4 0.01 0.02
f i M r
0 3e-3 0.04 0.36
1 1.015
f i M r
0 9e-4 0.002 0.11
f i M r
0 7e-4 8e-4 0.09
f i r M
0 2e-6 2e-4 0.001
f i M r
0 5e-4 9e-4 0.06
1 4
f i M r
0 6e-3 0.031 0.63
f i M r
0 5e-3 0.01 0.48
f i M r
0 3e-4 0.02 0.03
f i M r
0 4e-3 0.02 0.33
2 1.015
f i M r
0 0.001 0.001 0.1
f M i r
0 4e-4 9e-4 0.08
f i r M
0 3e-6 3e-4 0.001
f M i r
0 6e-4 6e-4 0.06
2 4
f i M r
0 7e-3 0.02 0.54
f M i r
0 5e-3 5e-3 0.41
f i M r
0 4e-4 0.02 0.03
f i M r
0 4e-3 0.01 0.29
4 1.015
f M i r
0 0.001 0.001 0.09
f M i r
0 3e-4 0.001 0.07
f i r M
0 5e-6 3e-4 0.001
f M i r
0 3e-4 8e-4 0.05
4 4
f i M r
0 0.008 0.02 0.44
f M i r
0 0.002 0.007 0.34
f i M r
0 6e-4 0.02 0.03
f i M r
0 5e-3 0.008 0.24
Table 4: Ination rate volatility for the four targeting procedures;  = relative risk aversion,
 = average growth rate of money supply, (A; s; G) = all three shocks are present, (A) =
only technology shocks are present, (s) = only money demand shocks are present, (G) = only
government spending shocks are present. In the cells we order the targeting procedures according
to the calculated volatility. For example
f i M r
0 9e-4 0.002 0.075
means that the lowest volatility
is achieved for the f-targeting, then for the i-targeting, M-targeting and the highest volatility is
observed for the r-targeting. The numbers below state the standard error of the logarithm of the
Hodrick-Prescott ltered series of the ination rate for a given targeting procedure.
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Welfare loss [%] with respect to f-targeting for stochastic tax rate and no scal decit case
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f i M r
  19 47 1768
f i M r
  17 39 1251
M r i f
-9e-3 -4e-3 -3e-5  
f i M r
  0.2 0.6 5.7
0.5 4
f i M r
  7 22 483
f i M r
  6 17 474
M i f r
-5e-3 -4e-6   3e-3
r f i M
-13   0.07 0.4
1 1.015
f M i r
  2e-3 5e-3 0.4
f i M r
  5e-3 5e-3 0.4
M r i f
-4e-3 -1e-3 -2e-5  
r M i f
-3e-4 -5e-6 -3e-6  
1 4
f M i r
  1e-3 2e-3 0.3
f i M r
  2e-3 3e-3 0.3
M r i f
-2e-3 -4e-4 -2e-6  
r M i f
-4e-4 -7e-6 -3e-6  
2 1.015
r i M f
-9 -0 .3 -0 .2  
r i M f
-7 -0 .2 -0 .1  
M r i f
-1e-3 -5e-4 -9e-6  
r i M f
-1 .3 -0 .03 -0 .02  
2 4
r i M f
-13 -0 .7 -0 .6  
r i M f
-10 -0 .5 -0 .3  
M r i f
-3e-4 -7e-5 -9e-7  
r M i f
-0 .8 -0 .03 -0 .02  
4 1.015
r i M f
-36 -5 .7 -1 .7  
r i M f
-19 -3 -0 .8  
M r i f
-4e-4 -2e-4 -5e-6  
r i M f
-1 .3 -0 .04 -0 .02  
4 4
r i M f
-84 -13 -4 .3  
r i M f
-73 -11 -3 .6  
M r i f
-4e-5 -1e-5 -3e-7  
r i M f
-0 .6 -0 .02 -0 .01  
Welfare loss [%] with respect to f-targeting for constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit
  (A; s; G) (A) (s) (G)
0.5 1.015
f i M r
  13 32 1240
f i M r
  11 25 860
M r i f
-9e-3 -2e-5 -1e-5  
f i M r
  0.1 0.6 4.4
0.5 4
f i M r
  62 935 8e8
f i M r
  57 630 3e8
r M i f
-0 .04 -0 .01 -1e-4  
f i M r
  3.8 3.8 6.8
1 1.015
f M i r
  4e-4 4e-3 0.4
f i M r
  4e-3 4e-3 0.4
M r i f
-3e-3 -7e-4 -6e-6  
r M i f
-3e-4 -5e-6 -3e-6  
1 4
f i r M
  4e-3 4e-3 0.4
f i M r
  4e-3 9e-3 0.4
r M i f
-7e-3 -4e-3 -9e-5  
r M i f
-4e-4 -3e-5 -5e-6  
2 1.015
r i M f
-9 .2 -0 .3 -0 .2  
r i M f
-6 .7 -0 .2 -0 .09  
M r i f
-1e-3 -3e-4 -3e-6  
r i M f
-1 .6 -0 .03 -0 .03  
2 4
r M i f
-28 -3 .4 -3  
r i M f
-21 -2 -1 .8  
M r i f
-9e-4 -3e-4 -6e-5  
r M i f
-1 .2 -0 .13 -0 .04  
4 1.015
r i M f
-34 -4 -1 .2  
r i M f
-17 -1 .9 -0 .5  
M r i f
-3e-4 -1e-4 -2e-6  
r i M f
-1 .6 -0 .04 -0 .02  
4 4
r i M f
-91 -15 -7 .8  
r i M f
-84 -14 -5 .6  
M i f r
-7e-5 -3e-5   5e-4
r M i f
-0 .9 -0 .07 -0 .04  
Table 5: Di¤erences in welfare levels achieved under the four targeting procedures;  = relative
risk aversion,  = average growth rate of money supply, (A; s; G) = all three shocks are present,
(A) = only technology shocks are present, (s) = only money demand shocks are present, (G) = only
government spending shocks are present. In the cells we order the targeting procedures according
to welfare. For example
r f i M
-0 .02   2e-5 0.03 means that the highest welfare is achieved for the
r-targeting, then for the f-targeting, i-targeting, and the lowest welfare is observed for the M-
targeting. The numbers below give the welfare loss (or gain when negative) for a given targeting
procedure with respect to the ination targeting.
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(a) Case with stochastic tax rate and no scal decit.
(b) Case with constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit.
Figure 1: Impulse responses of several variables (growth rate of capital t+1; ination rate ft+1;
consumption to capital ratio c^t; output to capita ratio y^t; real balances to capital ratio m^t; real
interest rate rt+1; tax rate  t; nominal interest rate it+1; money growth rate t+1) to a shock in
technology, under M-targeting (rst column), under i-targeting (second column), under f-targeting
(third column) and under r-targeting (fourth column) for  = 1 and  = 1:015.
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(a) Case with stochastic tax rate and no scal decit.
(b) Case with constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit.
Figure 2: Impulse responses of several variables (growth rate of capital t+1; ination rate ft+1;
consumption to capital ratio c^t; output to capita ratio y^t; real balances to capital ratio m^t; real
interest rate rt+1; tax rate  t; nominal interest rate it+1; money growth rate t+1) to a shock
in money demand, under M-targeting (rst column), under i-targeting (second column), under
f-targeting (third column) and under r-targeting (fourth column) for  = 1 and  = 1:015.
26
(a) Case with stochastic tax rate and no scal decit.
(b) Case with constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit.
Figure 3: Impulse responses of several variables (growth rate of capital t+1; ination rate ft+1;
consumption to capital ratio c^t; output to capita ratio y^t; real balances to capital ratio m^t; real
interest rate rt+1; tax rate  t; nominal interest rate it+1; money growth rate t+1) to a shock in
government spending, under M-targeting (rst column), under i-targeting (second column), under
f-targeting (third column) and under r-targeting (fourth column) for  = 1 and  = 1:015.
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Figure 4: Evolution of consumption over time in an economy hit by a random sequence of
technology shocks under the f-targeting and r-targeting for  = 0:5; 1, 2 and 4. The case (a)
corresponds to the scal scenario with stochastic tax rate and no scal decit, while the case (b)
corresponds to the scal scenario with constant tax rate and stochastic scal decit.
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